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CRIMINAL LAW:  SIXTH AMENDMENT, BATSON 
 
 
Summary 
 
 After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with the 
use of a deadly weapon, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and related crimes. 
Defendant was sentenced to death of each murder. The district court denied Defendant’s motion 
to suppress statements he made in two interviews with police after his initial appearance before a 
magistrate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying 
Defendant’s motion to suppress, as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his initial 
appearance before the magistrate, but Defendant waived his right to have counsel present at the 
subsequent interviews; but (2) the district court clearly erred when it rejected Defendant’s 
objection under Batson v. Kentucky to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove an 
African American from the venire during jury selection. Reversed and remanded.  
 
Background 
 
 Defendant McCarty was arrested for murder with the use of a deadly weapon, kidnapping, 
conspiracy and battery causing substantial bodily harm. Five days after the arrest, he appeared 
before a magistrate and was denied bail. Eight days later, he appeared for arraignment when he 
was appointed with counsel. During the eight days between his initial appearance and 
arraignment, McCarty was interrogated by the State. McCarty contends that the statements he 
made during the interrogations should have been suppressed because detectives deliberately 
elicited incriminating statements after his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached. The State 
contends that McCarty’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach until the district 
attorney filed “formal” charges, which was the same day when McCarty appeared for 
arraignment and appointed counsel. The district court denied a motion to suppress the statement.  
 
 McCarty also contended that the State engaged in discriminatory jury selection when it 
exercised peremptory strikes to remove two African-American prospective jurors from the venire. 
                                                     
1  By Nancy Snow. 
At the beginning of McCarty’s trail, the State exercised ten peremptory challenges, using two of 
them to strike two of the three remaining African Americans in the venire. McCarty objected to 
those two peremptory challenges as discriminatory, focusing primarily on prospective juror 
number 36, a married 28-year-old African-American mother of two who was a full-time college 
student. The State conducted independent research into her background based on her responds to 
questions during voir dire that her brother had been incarcerated. During the course of the 
investigation, the State used a Shared Computer Operations for Protection and Enforcement 
(SCOPE) background check mechanism and found that she held a valid work card for an adult 
nightclub.2 Referring to that information, the prostitution moved to remove juror 36 from the 
panel.  
 
 During trial, McCarty raised Batson objection 3  and argued that the State used 
prospective juror 36’s work card as pretext for purposeful discrimination. The district court 
interrupted defense counsel’s argument and held that the argument is for the Supreme Court and 
then continued with the peremptory challenges and jury sworn in proceeding.  
 
Discussion 
 
 On the issue of motion to suppress McCarty’s statements made during the interrogations, 
the Court disagreed with the State’s argument that attachment of the right to counsel requires that 
a public prosecutor (as distinct from a police officer) be aware of the initial proceeding or 
involved in its conduct, and held that the right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance before 
a judicial officer.4  The Court explained that under the federal standard, an accusation filed with 
a judicial officer is sufficiently formal, and the government’s commitment to prosecute it 
sufficiently concrete, when the accusation prompts arraignment and restrictions on the accused’s 
liberty to facilitate prosecution.5 Since an “initial appearance” has been characterized by the 
Court as a hearing at which a magistrate informs the defendant of the charge and various rights 
in further proceedings and determines the conditions for pretrial releases, McCarty’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached on May 30, 2006.  
                                                     
2  The investigation failed to uncover any information about the prospective juror’s brother.  
3  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that 
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.”) 
4  Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008). 
5  Id. at 210. 
  However, the Court did not find McCarty’s Sixth Amendment right was violated because 
McCarty has failed to demonstrate that his Miranda waiver was not voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent. The Court held that “…when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which includes 
the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that 
typically does the trick” because even though the Miranda rights have their foundation in the 
Fifth Amendment, a Miranda advisement is sufficient to apprise a defendant of the nature of his 
Sixth Amendment rights and the consequences of abandoning those rights.”6  
 
 The Court applied Batson three-step analysis set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in its evaluation of Defendant’s equal protection challenge to the State’s exercise of a 
peremptory challenge.7 The three steps are: the opponent of the peremptory challenge must first 
make out a prima facie case of discrimination; then the production burden shifts to the proponent 
of the challenge to assert a neutral explanation for the challenge that is “clear and reasonable 
specific.” Finally, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the challenge has proved 
purposeful discrimination.  The final step involves evaluating the persuasiveness of the 
justification proffered by the prosecutor, but the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial 
motivation rest with, and never shirts from, the opponent of the strike. A district court may not 
unreasonably limit the defendant’s opportunity to prove that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking 
minority veniremembers were pretextual.8 The district court should sustain the Batson objection 
and deny the peremptory challenge if it is more likely than not that the challenge was improperly 
motivated.9 
 
 Because the district court’s decision at step one is moot, and Defendant does not argue 
that the State’s explanations for striking the prospective jurors were facially discriminatory, the 
Court only addressed the third step of the Batson inquiry here.  
 
                                                     
6  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 797 (2009). 
7  Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 332, 91 P.3d 16, 29 (2004); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) 
(summarizing the three-step Batson analysis). 
8  Conner v. State, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 327 P.3d 503, 509 (2014).  
9  Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005); see also Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 215 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 The State’s explanation for striking prospective juror 36 was that the State was uneasy 
about her possession of a valid work card for an adult nightclub. However, this information was 
uncovered after the State had conducted the SCOPE background check on her. The State’s 
original reason for conducting the independent background investigation was her disclosure of 
her brother’s criminal history.  
 
 The Court concluded that the State’s strip-club explanation implausible because the State 
did not make any inquiry on whether the remaining 34 prospective jurors had also obtained a 
valid work card of similar kind. The Court reasoned that if prospective juror 36’s possession of a 
valid work card for an adult nightclub indeed made the State uneasy, it should have also been 
worried about the other 34 prospective jurors on whom it did not conduct a SCOPE background 
check to determine whether they had obtained a valid work card within the last three years. The 
Court held that this disparate treatment supports the conclusion that it is more likely than not that 
the reason given for striking prospective juror 36 were mere pretext for purposeful 
discrimination.10   
 
 Further, the district court admitted it was concerned about the State’s independent 
investigation into prospective juror 36’s background, but it nevertheless disregarded Defendant’s 
attempt to show that it was unlikely prospective juror currently worked at an adult nightclub. The 
Court held that the district court failed to undertake the sensitive inquiry into all the relevant 
circumstances required by Batson and its progeny before rendering its decision.11  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court concluded that the district court clearly erred by allowing the State to exercise 
a peremptory challenge to dismiss prospective juror 36. Because this error is structural,12 the 
Court reverse the judgment of conviction and remand this matter to the district court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                                     
10  See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 244 (2004). 
11  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 96.  
12  Diomampo v. State, 124 Nev. 414, 423, 185 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2008). 
